Palestine Never Existed
- Dhu al-Qarnayn Al-Sefrahn
- Dec 29, 2025
- 10 min read
Now that you’re unsettled, please read on. The foundation of this thesis does not come from the Zionist world, which offers a vision in which they—settlers legitimized by a bogus resolution and by a state of permanent war—are the “true” residents of those lands, and therefore entitled to commit something as horrific as genocide. It comes, rather, from a historical-political consideration that, unfortunately, very few still have the courage to articulate.
The Principle: The Age of Pharaohs and Babylonians
What we know about the very ancient period comes from biblical descriptions and from what can be inferred from the scant papyrus and inscriptional record of Egyptian and Babylonian times.
We know that the land was identified as the land of the “Canaanite tribes,” which often rebelled against the Pharaohs. Famous is the great revolt against Thutmose III, which saw the Pharaoh leave the lands of the Nile—an extremely rare event—in order to crush the insurrection once and for all. Almost no juridical structures more elaborate than simple tribes are mentioned, except those introduced by the Philistines, an apparently highly belligerent people who managed to impose themselves in the region. They brought the first major ethnic and cultural influences: they took the Canaanite pantheon and added something of their own, creating the cult of Baal, today particularly known among those involved in “black” esotericism. We also know that under Babylonian domination there were the first deportations, a practice widely used in antiquity: it consisted in assimilating part of a population and then releasing it, with the aim of spreading the dominant culture.
The Jewish context is introduced mainly in the Old Testament, which is nonetheless supported by some Egyptian finds that attest to its existence—not only as a population, but also as an apparently established state reality (Israelis claim the existence of the fabled kingdom, although on an archaeological and historical level it has not yet been possible to substantiate this thesis). In any case, historical and religious contexts confirm that this is a land inhabited for a very long time, perhaps even before the arrival of the Pharaohs.
The Brief Rise of the Judeans and Roman Rule
There are many shadowy moments in the historical evolution of the native populations. During the Persian and then Hellenistic periods there are no descriptions of those areas; we must wait for the Romans to have a more complete picture—roughly half a millennium after the last recorded events. An enormous span, on which one could truly say anything.
Under Rome, we know there are mainly four major entities: the Kingdom of Galilee, the Kingdom of Judea, the Kingdom of Samaria, and the Decapolis. Alongside these there was also a fifth small entity, Perea, linked to the Kingdom of Judea.
These realities corresponded to different tribes, characterized by rather diverse origins and cultures. Among those identified, the largest are: Judeans, Samaritans, Pharisees, and Zealots. The Torah-based Judaism was the most widely shared cult, even if there were different interpretations of the text, which is why there was great friction and hostility that often culminated in violence among the different groups. The ethnicity that ultimately prevailed over the others was precisely the Judean one; later it “sold itself” to Rome, thus managing to establish itself as Rome’s favored interlocutor.
The Judean ascendancy, however, was destined to last very little: the hostility toward Rome was so strong that it provoked several rebellions, culminating in the Hadrianic era and leading to the dissolution of the Kingdom of Judea and annexation to the Empire.
Indeed, the name “Palestine” and its territorial configuration are the product of a Roman bureaucratic artifice. After victory in the Bar-Kokhba revolt (the Third Jewish War, 132 CE) and after the destruction of the Temple and much of the sacred buildings for the Judean population, Emperor Hadrian, probably as a gesture of contempt, ordered not only that the administration be merged with the Province of Syria, but also that the name Palestine be added—a term which in Hebrew referred to the “Palestim,” that is, the Philistines, already the dominators and enemies of the Jewish communities.
Under Roman rule—directly and indirectly from 50/60 CE to 632 CE—Palestine underwent innumerable cultural, ethnic, and above all religious changes, moving from Torah Judaism to Greco-Roman pantheism to Christianity, which more than anything else shaped a first real identity of that land, far more than the Jewish religion did.
The Advent of Islam and the Crusades
With the seventh century and the birth of Islam, the conquests of Caliph Abu Bakr reached the Province of Palestine as well, which experienced another violent and rapid wave of change. The imposition of a new language, a new religion, and the arrival of yet another strongly self-identifying group with its own cultural practices further upended the region’s historical, ethnic, and cultural legacy.
The impact of the new administration was very heavy; Islamic imposition made itself felt with great intensity. The last reforms of Emperor Heraclius had torn the population apart because of the war effort against the Persians. The inhabitants of the region therefore preferred conversion over paying the various taxes levied on non-Muslims, among them the jizya, a tax that allowed one to profess a different religion and be considered a citizen.
Administratively, we know that the former Province of Palestine was abolished and merged into the different “souls” that over time would reshape the caliphate—from Arabia to Damascus to Egypt—until the Crusader conquest, which from 1098 placed the region under Latin control under the name Kingdom of Jerusalem.
The Christian administration strengthened even further the already robust Christian presence, also bringing Latin and Greek back into prominence. The presence of the new maritime republics, Genoa and Venice, and of the powerful monastic orders, brought a great wave of development and militarization, as well as a new ethnic-cultural characterization very different from what came before. The construction of new churches and the strengthening of certain radically Christian strongholds—among them Anthedon, Ascalon, and, yes, Gaza (coincidentally the area later deliberately highly Islamized, where Hamas established its base and marginalized Christians, and where the IDF has looted, defaced, and destroyed most of the churches, among the oldest in the world)—contributed to reinforcing the Christian presence.
In this historical moment, the great victory of Baldwin IV, the young King of Jerusalem, is cathartic: in 1177 he defeated the Ayyubid Sultan Saladin at Montgisard. A contingent of volunteers and knights from Gaza took part, led by the Templar Grand Master Odo of St Amand.
Whether one likes it or not, the region’s strong Christian roots deeply shaped and influenced local culture, uniting Arab and Mediterranean ethnicities under a single umbrella identifiable with the name “Levantine,” referring to the Levant, the name used for that coastal zone of the Mediterranean. This very strong identity solidified and continued even after the end of Latin rule. This ethno-cultural legacy became so consolidated, and in so little time, that Saladin was forced to accept the maintenance of religious orders and granted pilgrimages and openings to Europe to avoid rebellions and revolts.
The passage of the Mongols first and the Turcomans later did not change the region’s balance: it remained under the firm control of the Egyptian Sultanate, which out of necessity kept relations open with the Latins and Constantinople, since the Islamization of the territory, as said, had been particularly difficult. Despite this, the ethnic and cultural mixing among Latin, Greek, Turkish, Arab, Maghrebi realities, etc., did not allow for serene coexistence, so much so that the Sultans—like the Latins before them—revitalized quarters divided by ethnicity and later also by religion.
Ottoman Suppression
In the mid-sixteenth century the Ottomans arrived. Strong from their recent expansions and from their control over the Queen of Cities—Constantinople—they brought under their control all the lands of the Egyptian Mamluk Sultanate, which included this region as well. According to documentation, Palestine seems to return to being called “Felestin,” since the Ottomans revitalized the Roman administrative system and therefore the names used by it. This designation, however, declined over time, since in eighteenth-century maps we see the region divided into several governorships, even being incorporated into Greater Syria during the Turko-Egyptian war of 1840.
In any case, unlike their predecessors, the Ottomans did not show the same regard for the population’s customs and imposed a strong cultural and religious clampdown, carrying out major assimilation campaigns: they Islamized the territory, very often by force, attacking what were the Levantine customs and usages. The Ottoman grip was very successful, also because Christian Europe was not in the political and strategic condition to respond. Thus died the only historical hope these peoples might have had to unify into a well-defined national reality.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the now unstoppable Ottoman decline reached its peak with the internal uprisings of the late 1800s, in particular the Young Turk Revolution, which made it possible to restore constitutional principles. In that context, the forces of the region leaned on political realities in Syria or Egypt, unlike the rather minor Jewish community, which founded its own party based on ethno-laborist principles.
With defeat in the First World War, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the region passed into British hands, further changing its shape and boundaries.
The Palestinian Mandate
The region regained its historic administrative name, but was nevertheless tied, for reasons including proximity, to the mandates of Egypt and Jordan, being logistically fundamental. Lax British policies did not improve an internal situation already culturally divided, ethnically distinct, and religiously too heterogeneous. Thus the anti-British Islamic sentiment that brewed in academic environments began to prevail, where the Qur’an found a forcedly literal and violent interpretation. Added to this, the British Empire implemented the principles of the Balfour Declaration (1917), previously stipulated with the Ottomans, which provided for facilitating the entry of Nordic and Slavic Jews—another ethnic-cultural addition—formed in particular by those who defined themselves “children of Zion,” who would become the Zionists, with ideas promoting an ethno-state. With this last act, the region had all it needed to become a powder keg.
With the advent of the Second World War, Islamic representatives seized the moment and turned to the Axis to request support against the British and the Jewish population, increasingly numerous and cohesive around the Zionist idea. There were various instances of clashes in this period, but the Islamic reality tended not to move proactively, waiting for European support that would never arrive.
With the arrival of 1945, the European Jewish settlers of Zionist matrix were now in the thousands. Christians found themselves increasingly in the minority, and the Islamic counterpart divided among different currents, often spilling into reciprocal violence. The die was cast; the Zionist project was at the door.
The State of Israel
With 1948 came the end of a long process—probably deliberate—of colonization of the region. With yet another bureaucratic artifact, new borders were arbitrarily established, separating ethnicities and cultures often quite similar, giving rise to the creation of the State of Israel thanks to UN Resolution 181, strongly wanted by all the victorious powers, but especially by the USSR, which saw Zionism as an ideology close to itself.
The outcome of the clashes that followed could only favor Israel, which had British arsenals in its hands and the backing of all major powers. The advent of Israel, like that of previous realities, was violent and assimilationist. Expropriations and destruction were the order of the day; Jews who did not support the cause and non-Jewish locals living within the new state were treated as second-class citizens (to this day it is so), and those who remained on the other side were too heterogeneous to unite and create a reality capable of responding firmly.
This culminated in the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973), when Arab states, especially Syria and Egypt, attempted a joint effort to stop the Israeli state, but the campaign failed miserably. The Israeli victory laid the foundations not only for its definitive legitimization, granted by the right of conquest, but also for the collaborationist policy that neighboring states would begin to adopt toward it. This policy is visible today in the nonexistent reactions of these nations to the latest massacres perpetrated.
Moreover, from this moment on, Mossad’s interference in the affairs of the native people would grow ever stronger and ever more functional to its dialectic of perpetual war, ensuring there would always be a succession of corrupt, incapable leaders—or worse, leaders of a terrorist stamp. In this way, the already scant possibilities of creating a Nation (that is, a union of individuals in a community sharing a strong cultural and religious history) and consequently a State (a higher reality, generally formed by individuals of shared ethnicity and religion, in order best to advance its own interests and those of the nation it represents) become practically nil.
As the decades pass, the abuses of the dominators do not diminish; they worsen, and the internal situation, as well designed, does not unify in the slightest but fractures more and more, until it even reaches the distinction between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The peak of despair arrives with the Oslo Accords (1993), where the PLO carries out one of the most suicidal maneuvers ever made by a political entity (perhaps comparable to the PCI promoting the EU): it speaks in the name of the “Palestinian” people, a fundamentally nonexistent reality, in order to agree to a two-state solution with the very nations that pushed them to be segregated into mountains and deserts. Needless to say, these accords were totally useless and contributed to increasing divisions, disparities, and Israeli pressure, leading up to the events of October 7, when a jubilant Israel finally was able to continue its projects interrupted in 1967—namely, creating “Greater Israel”—with the tacit support of neighbors and the complicity of all European and Western nations.
Conclusion
Following this quick explanation, several things become clear. First, the complexity of the historical path this region has lived through; second, how—especially in the last centuries—external realities intervened destructively, dissolving the historical-cultural “glue”; and finally, perhaps the most important point, how the term “Palestine” is a pure administrative creation which over time has never reached any kind of cultural and religious connotation.
Analyzing the current situation, we find two important factors. On the one hand, there is a major religious difference: there are various Christian denominations, especially in Gaza, completely marginalized; the Islamic majority divided into as many different denominations, all enemies among themselves; and the native Jewish minority unable to express itself clearly. This fragmentation makes it impossible for there to be a religion capable of regulating the collective imagination and acting as social glue. On the other hand, cultural and ethnic diversity prevents the recovery of shared historical roots, especially in the Levantine tradition—long since lost (and it is not enough to rely on the rhetoric “we are the dispossessed of ’48”)—thus preventing the creation of a common basis for a future as a nation.
We confirm all of this simply by observing the communities abroad and within the State of Israel. These, in fact, have not lifted a finger to help their fellow countrymen, preferring the comfortable life of the exile or the second-class citizen, confirming the view that no national feeling exists; at most, for some, there is empathy toward their compatriots. In the absence of these fundamental factors, it becomes impossible—from a geopolitical, historical, and cultural point of view—to speak of Palestine and Palestinians as a national reality; the final consequence is that it becomes even less credible to speak of it as a state entity.
With this, of course, one does not mean to legitimize Israel—on the contrary—but to make the generic protester who ignores the historical excursus understand that a reality that does not exist and has no foundations upon which to unite will be destined to perish against one that is strongly homogeneous on the ethnic, religious, and cultural plane.
Palestine Never Existed
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